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Business Development (BD) I 
Technology Development (TD) 
Phase II 
Request for Proposal (RFP) to 
Subcontract Award 
. . 
\ After the contract has L. 
been awarded, Phase III ................. ::·· 
(Performance) of the 
subcontract begins 
: ...................................................................... : 
I Phase II supports the Phase I activities in BD i 
/ & TD. This Phase includes the RF! & RFP 
············ process in soliciting suppliers 
....................................................................................................................... 
Phase III 
Performance of the Subcontract 
·············::::::::, .. 
1·····;h~;~··;·~-b~;~~;·;·,;~·;;z;·b~f o;;··the en·;:~;········i 
Phase IV 
Closeout 
/ the contract, this ensures all paperwork 
I.... and.deliverables _are. accounted for ....................... ) 
Program Life Cycle 
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• Invite new subcontractor candidates to visit the prime's facility 
and demonstrate/present their qualifications 
• Review available subcontractor data from prior programs 
• Supplier Directory 
• Prior Engineering, Quality Assurance, and Performance 
Surveys 
• Acquisition Data Center Records 
• Subcontractor Performance Report Cards 
• Subcontractor Engineering Capability Assessments 
• Dunn & Bradstreet report 
• Understand Supplier DNA 
. . 
Case ofth.e.PoortSnpp}ie1tAssessment. 
• Subcontract value delta 
increases are primarily due to: 
- Late requirement definition 
- Customer driven new scope 
- Quality and test failures driving 
spec changes, repairs and re-
works 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
• X has not been in good financial straights from the very beginning 
- the selection criteria did not analyze X' financial health before the 
subcontract was awarded 
• X financial position handicapped its ability to adjust to audible(s) 
• X did not have the resources to apply in time of crisis 
Phase III - Performance 
[ PRIME J 
• Requirements Management 
• Configuration Management 
• Data Management 
• Interface Management 
• Lessons Learned 
[ SUBCONTRACTOR J 
The Six Sigma Team 
Dave Orlando Marcia Wilson Sammy Petrelli 
Michael Narigon Steve Hixson 
Ray Crew (not pictured) 
Problem. Statement 
• This project was initiated to address the 
performance (mainly cost) issues associated 
with the major sensors, their aggregate Cost 
Performance Index was .90: this represented 
vast inefficiencies with our major suppliers. 
" .::·::.}?··, ,' ' " " " .. .. 
The Six Sigma Process 
D 
' 
Define the Problem 
aggregate Cost Performance Index was .90: this represented vast 
inefficiencies with our major suppliers 
Measure 
104 parameters were identified 
10 major Acquisition managers were interviewed 
Analyze 
Used Minitab to run Regression tests; Identified 3 key correlations 
TRL, Level of BOE, and Number of IBR Findings 
Improve 
Update relevant manuals and implemented training 
Control 
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No. of Findings (correlation = -.59) 
• Data suggests the Number of IBR findings as a potential Tripwire 
No. of findings may be indicator of systemic issues, beyond just needing the 
action items answered 
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% Engineering Estimate (correlation = -.75) 
• BOE detail may be a predictor of cost performance 
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Forecast VAC assumes TCP!== !TD CPI for current 
subcontracts 
9 10 
• Technology maturity is a measure of 
the degree to which proposed critical 
technologies meet program objectives; 
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• TRL9: Actual technology system qualified through successful mission 
operations. 
• TRL8: Actual technology system completed and qualified through test and 
demonstration. 
• TRL 7: Technology system prototype demonstration in an operational 
environment. 
• TRL6: Technology system I subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a 
relevant environment. 
• TRL5: Technology component and/or basic technology subsystem validation in 
relevant environment. 
• TRL4: Technology component and/or basic technology subsystem validation in 
laboratory environment. 
• TRL3: Analytical and experimental critical function and/ or characteristic proof-
of-concept. 
• TRL2: Technology concept and/or application formulated. 
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\ . . . 
Additional Common Factors · 
"Good" Performers 
• Non-competitive S/K 
- Already teammate or selected 
supplier at time of prime 
contract award 
- High probability of realism 
vs. price-to-win 
"Poor" Performers 
• Highly competitive environment for 
Prime at time subs negotiated 
Accepted success-oriented bids, 
overlooked risk to keep program 
sold 
• Low product design maturity 
- Even though some had high TRL 
• Overstated heritage 
- Either not recognized by Prime, 
or Prime accepted risk 
- Minimal cost reserves & schedule 
slack 
• Funding profiles that changed year-
to-year 
• Acquisition Managers forget who 
they are working for 
.Need for ''Trip Wires" 
• Typically, we assume that a subcontractor will "be like us", problems 
surface, we wait too late to become "intrusive" 
• Problem surface early in two areas: ability to manage cost and schedule and 
ability to follow a disciplined design review process 
• Two early events in the life of a subcontract allow the prime insight into the 
adequacy of a subcontractor's processes 
- IBR 
- SRRorPDR 
• Measurable, unambiguous entry and exit criteria must be established for 
these events 
Supported by our specialists in these areas 
Defined course of action in the event of failure 
Don't be timid about piling on resources to fix early (sometimes 
Managers forget who they work for) 
• Cheaper to "pay me now" rather than "pay me later" 
• Prime is only as good as the weakest subcontractor process 
'"N.eedI.fo"ri;Suti'.~dn'.tfi'Ctot. 
Scorecard 
• Best to have a process of competitive selection to determine your 
subcontractor 
- Industry consolidation has made this more difficult 
• Learn the same lessons again on a different program 
• Disciplined, focused process by which we evaluate the subcontractors 
• Need to stratify between fundamental company issues 
( capability shortfalls, etc.) and program personnel issues 
- Gather data from previous experiences beyond the rating "numbers" 
• Interview personnel that have worked with the business unit 
- As a sub and a customer 
- Structure the subcontract management team to shore up identified 
weaknesses 
- Standardized set of metrics to demonstrate execution improvement 
.tNeed1:f6ti.~'IRtr{l.:si1te~~.tD;estgn 
Review. Process 
• When we do have problems with subcontractors, the statement is made 
after the fact that we didn't "dig deeply enough in their design review" 
• Must get the most qualified non-advocates to review the subcontractor's 
design 
- If expertise does not exist within, get experts from outside the company 
- Non-advocates must spend the time they need with the subcontractor's 
design personnel to understand the design -
• not a two-day "dog and pony" show 
• Consider parallel design analysis 
• Fund engineering models 
• We must not add to the problem by flowing down TBD' s 
- Even if we 're not sure on a particular requirement, pick a value that's 
close 
• Probably less impact than leaving it TBD 
• Team building is hard and takes time 
- Knowing your team-mates strengths (and weaknesses) can greatly reduce 
risk and save money 
• Don't assume the subcontractor is like you 
- Most likely, they're not 
• Make sure expectations are known in both directions 
• Work through the IPT structure 
- It provides reach into their organization 
• Need to understand the subcontractor goes up considerably if the 
subcontractor is providing you with a product and service 
- Product-only subcontract is more transactional and measurable 
Product and service subcontractor is more relational and can be difficult 
to measure and control 
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Would've Dope Differently 
• Program B 
- "Compete the work with a comprehensive RFP 
- "Identify and resolve key issues 
- "Write a good contract 
- "Incentivize good behavior through the contract 
- "Write complete specs; identify problems early via IBR & SRR 
- "Take corrective action early 
- "Build Engineering Models" 
• Program C 
- "Improve CDR detail - dig in more deeply 
- "More Prime/ sub-contractor interface 
- "Determine sub-contractor weakness early 
- "Generate recovery plan 
- "Re-bid some parts of the subcontract" 
• Learn as much as you can, in advance, about their culture (DNA) 
• Know the subcontract language by heart 
- You can generally bet the subcontractor will, usually one of our weaknesses 
• Nail down everything you can and make effective use of SHALLs 
- Be exact on what's required 
• Make effective use of Award Fee 
- Motivate good behavior, discourage bad 
• Limit "work share" arrangements, if you can 
- Split work based on strengths and competencies, not on percentages 
• Be clear on "roles and responsibilities" 
- Will they be treated as a Partner or Sub? 
• Don't hesitate to intervene when necessary 
- The prime is ultimately responsible 
- If it doesn't seem like it's getting better it probably isn't 
• Work corporate relationships to bring added pressures to bare 
• NPOESS 
- Managed by two Government Organizations 
• Users and Payees cannot agree 
• Paperwork to administer changes is horrendous 
• Government Furnished Equipment 
- Incomplete handoff 
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PROCESS 
• Systemic Issue with Government Acquisitions 
• Priced to Win Strategy 
• No stable funding 
• Requirements are volatile 
• Changing Schedule 
Areas of Cost Growth 
• 21 percent of cost growth was due to demanding performance 
requirements. 
• 21 percent of overruns was caused by funding delays and 
cutbacks. 
• 18 percent of overruns resulted from inaccurate government 
cost estimates. 
• 15 percent of overruns reflected flaws in the acquisition 
process. 
• 13 percent resulted from distortions caused by the competitive 
dynamic among contractors. 
• 10 percent of cost growth was caused by high turnover or 
inadequate skills in the public and private-sector workforce. 
And the remaining two percent resulted from "industrial base" considerations. 
•TO DELIVER A HIGH QUALITY PRODUCTAND ACHIEVE HIGH 
CUSTOMER SATISFACTION 
CUSTOMER 
PRIME I TRUST I SUPPLIER 
TRAINING 
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Acquisition Manager of a Ma 
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Top 5 U.S. Defense Contta'Ctor 20!05 
Rank Name Defense Revenue 0/o of total 
(US $ million) revenue 
1 Lockheed Martin 34,050 95.8 
2 Boeing 30,464 58.1 
3 Northrop Grumman 22,126 74.0 
4 Raytheon 18,771 92.7 
5 General Dynamics 15,000 78.2 
Source: www.defensenews.com 
Today'S Space .Manufacturing 
• Before 
- l\1anagetnentof 
Suppliers was viewed as 
top down 
- Cost was the tnain driver 
of selection 
• Today 
- Suppliers are viewed as 
partners critical to the 
supply chain and product 
developtnent 
Major Space Corporations are focusing on their core competencies and 
becoming major system integrators. 
